STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of M.L.L., a/k/a M.L.L., Minor. FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, **UNPUBLISHED** January 14, 2003 Petitioner-Appellee, No. 241677 v Delta Circuit Court Family Division TARA L. NICKELL, LC No. 98-000146-NA Respondent-Appellant. In the Matter of J.C., Minor. FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, Petitioner-Appellee, No. 241678 v Delta Circuit Court TARA L. NICKELL, Family Division LC No. 98-000147-NA Respondent-Appellant, and BRIAN CHRISTIANSON, Respondent. In the Matter of R.K.C., Minor. FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TARA L. NICKELL,

No. 241679 Delta Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 01-000006-NA

Respondent-Appellant,

and

BRIAN CHRISTIANSON,

Respondent.

Before: Meter, P.J., and Neff and Donofrio, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), (g) and (j). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). With regard to § 19b(3)(c)(ii), the evidence established that respondent-appellant was notified of the chronically unclean condition of the home, as well as her failure to properly care for the children and her use of inappropriate methods of discipline, including directing that M.L.L. be tied to a tree and have her mouth taped. The evidence further established that respondent-appellant received services to assist her in addressing these issues, but failed to rectify the conditions. *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 640; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was warranted under § 19b(3)(c)(ii).

Further, considering the evidence that respondent-appellant failed to maintain a clean home, failed to ensure that her children's hygiene was adequate, failed to ensure that the oldest child attended school regularly, failed to appropriately discipline the children, and failed to benefit from services designed to address these issues, the court did not clearly err in finding that termination was also justified under § 19b(3)(g).

We likewise conclude that the trial court properly found that § 19b(3)(j) was established, because the foregoing evidence established a reasonable likelihood, based on respondent-appellant's prior conduct, that the children would be harmed if they were returned to respondent-appellant's home.

Finally, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. The evidence demonstrated that the children made significant gains in foster care, and their return to respondent-appellant would significantly jeopardize their welfare. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, *supra*.

Affirmed.

- /s/ Patrick M. Meter
- /s/ Janet T. Neff
- /s/ Pat M. Donofrio